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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Canada from 1973 to 1984 had three official recessions accompanied 
by policies of monetary and fiscal restraint. During that period, 
housing expenditures, in contrast to other social programs, fared rather 
well due to the small size of government housing programs, the negative 
impact of high interest rates on housing starts, the political impact 
of affordability problems, and the increased use of tax expenditures. 
In theory, Canadian restraint measures were intended to be directed in 
such a way that those who were most in need would be helped by social 
housing programs. In reality, the social and private housing sectors 
were treated quite differently. Contrary to popular belief, subsidies 
on social housing were held to a minimum while private sector assistance 
fluctuated dramatically depending upon market conditions. In addition, 
while much of private sector support was provided in the form of 
relatively hidden tax expenditures, non-market social housing subsidies 
were provided up-front through direct public expenditures. The net 
distributional effect of the changes increased the bias of Canada's 
complex set of housing subsidies toward home ownership and private 
rentals over various forms of social housing. 
In general, the affordability of accommodation and profitability of 
the housing sector have been a major preoccupation of governments in 
most OECD countries during the past decade. (Burke, P. et al, 1981; 
Howenstine, 1983, ll9ff; Stone, 1983, 99ff) What has made the Canadian 
response distinct is not the recession, which had parallels in other 
countries, but the particular nature of the Canadian economy. Canada 
is among those few countries which have been classified as dominion 
capitalist. (Ehrensaft, 1981, 99ff) A defining characteristic of a 
dominion capitalist country is that while it enjoys an advanced standard 
of living similar to metropolitan nations such as the United States or 
Germany, it is also economically truncated. Hence, it is very vulnerable 
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to major structural changes in the world economy and dependent on metro-
politan countries to provide the initiative in overcoming recessionary 
tendencies. Some features which have circumscribed the economic trunca-
tion of Canada are export dependency on primary products, a small highly 
sheltered manufacturing sector, a plethora of foreign-based multinationals, 
and trade domination by the United States. In housing, as in other areas, 
economic truncation means that Canada not only is fiscally restrained by 
its southern neighbour but also restricted in the policy options which 
are considered politically acceptable. As in the U.S., reliance on 
private sector housing is greater than most countries of Europe. Similarly, 
home ownership is ideologically espoused more than rental accommodation. 
Therefore, intervention in the housing market is more restrictive than 
in many OECD nations. To understand the Canadian housing response in 
a period of restraint requires an appreciation of the characteristics of 
economic truncation. 
2.0 ECONOMIC TRUNCATION AND CANADIAN HOUSING 
Officially Canada is rarely, if ever, labelled as economically trunca-
ted. Instead it is described as a 11 Small open economy 11 which is very 
sensitive to international capital flows, (Pesando, 1983, 1) and a 11 medium-
sized country that is heavily dependent on its external trade. 11 (Economic 
Council of Canada, 1983, 17) Nevertheless, a close examination of the 
economy and of external trade suggests that truncation is not an inappro-
priate appellation. The traditional position of Canada as a trading 
nation relies mainly on the export of primary products (wheat, timber, 
minerals) and semi-fabricated goods (pulp and iron, not paper and steel). 
In addition, the bulk of that trade is with one country - the United 
States. In the two export areas where manufactured goods, rather than 
primary products, account for growth in Canadian exports, the dependency 
on the U.S.A. is almost total. The two areas are automotive parts and 
defence equipment. As a consequence, Canada is not only the United States 1 
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largest trading partner, it is practically an extension of the American 
industrial market. 
While the historical roots of dependency were established just after 
Confederation (1867), the foreign ownership of Canadian companies intensi-
fied with the growth of the multinationals. "Since World War II, foreign 
corporations in resource extraction and in manufacturing have become so 
dominant in Canada that they have replaced Canada's native trading and 
banking bourgeoisie as the predominant force in the Canadian state." 
(Laxer, 1973, 127) By the mid-sixties, 58% of all manufacturing assets 
and 63% of all profits were dominated by non-resident ownership. The 
growth of the American branch plant, in particular, soon became the estab-
1 i shed institutional form within which the production of most manufactured 
goods took place. Increasingly domestic manufacturing was oriented to 
the U.S. or simply undertook the responsibility of "Canadianizing" 
American goods. The branch plant was never designed to enter export mar-
kets. Instead resource extraction was given a priority. 
All of this should not be taken to mean that there was an American 
conspiracy or that there are no indigenous multinationals. "The large 
American sector within the Canadian economy has been acquired, company by 
company, in straightforward and legitimate business dealings." (Rotstein, 
1984, 25) Canadians, or at least a small Canadian elite, have sold their 
assets quite voluntarily. On the other hand, there can be little doubt 
that some of the consequences of foreign ownership have been the erosion 
of technological innovations and productivity, the maintenance of high 
interest rates, the frequent inability of Canada to undertake new domestic 
initiatives without impinging on American policy, and trade imbalances 
heavily reliant on national resources. Indirectly these all affect the 
housing sector and housing policy either because they have tended to 
lower Canadian wages relative to the Americans, increased prices (including 
house prices), or restricted direct expenditures of the welfare state on 
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social housing. The dependency on U.S. demand, for example, means that 
the Canadian business cycle parallels the U.S. with a lag which, in turn, 
influences Canada 1 s residential building cycle and mortgage rates. 
A recent public document acknowledges that about 90% of technology 
used in Canada is imported and that Canada trails most developed countries 
in the private funding of research and development. (Canada, Department 
of Finance, 1984b, 25) The low rate in R & D expenditures is particularly 
obvious in foreign controlled firms. The problem is aggravated by de-
clining productivity levels and wage rates. On average, Canadian 
performance is poor relative to OECD countries and since 1978 it has 
deteriorated. (Rotstein, 1984, 45) Canada 1 S capacity to maintain high 
quality affordable housing is affected by the decline. Since the decline 
has also occurred at a time when inflationary rates have been high, 
nominal increases in wages of Canadian workers have not been accompanied 
by improvements in productivity. Real wages have fallen during the 
recessionary period and the capacity of the average worker to maintain 
housing standards has deteriorated. 
The heavy reliance upon the export of resources (about 60% of all 
exports) is associated with two other 4i~tinctive features of the Canadian 
economy: 11 ti ed 11 growth and consistently high unemployment rates. 11 Ti ed 11 
growth refers to the close dependency on changes in U.S. demand to 
stimulate the Canadian economy. Hence, the Canadian cycle of growth 
parallels, in many respects, what happens in the U.S.A., thougb the 
Canadian pattern of growth or decline lags behind its Ame~ican counter-
part due to the delayed demand for resources. In the period from 1973 
to 1984, Canada had three official years of recession: (1974-75, 1980, 
and 1981-82) though most of the period has been associated with lack-
lustre economic performance. (Canada, Department of Finance, 1984a, 9) 
Prior to 1974, Canada 1 s overall economic performance was strong. It 
began to slip from 1974 to 1980 and has been relatively poor compared to 
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the U.S. since 1981 (Table 1). The uncertainty of American demand for 
basic resources has not only meant that Canadian Growth since the mid 
197Ds has fallen to about half of its earlier trend, but also has genera-
ted very high levels of unemployment. (DECO, 1982, 7) As Table 1 
indicates, Canada usually has a higher unemployment rate than most DECO 
countries. With the exception of the United Kingdom, which in recent 
years has had even higher rates, Canada has had one of the worst records 
in terms of unemployment among developed countries. Not surprisingly, 
unemployment is disproportionately concentrated in the resource-based 
sector. Many forecasts maintain that the double digit unemployment of 
1982-84 will probably remain to the early 199Ds. (Rotstein, 1984, 
footnote 36) 
The response of the Canadian government to the recessionary challenge 
has been a mixture of restrictive monetary policies and compensating 
fiscal policies. The restrictive monetary policies were initiated in 
1975 following the worldwide inflation which began to accelerate following 
the increases in oil prices by OPEC nations (1973) and wheat prices in 
the U.S.A. (1972). They have only begun to ease off during the past two 
years. The rationale for a restrictive policy was that the cycle of 
inflationary expectations could be controlled through the money supply. 
The result was a reduction of high inflation rates to between 5 and 6 per 
cent in 1984. (Rotstein, 1984, 16) However, these were combined with 
the high rates of unemployment noted above and equally high interest 
rates. Normally Canada has had a high interest rate policy to assure 
the inflow of capital from the U.S.A. With two exceptions (e.g., 1973 
and 1975), high interest rates were maintained during the recession 
(Table 2). As a consequence, the unemployment rate tended to be higher 
than most OECD countries and Canadian mortgage prices were high relative 
to those in the U.S.A. 
Prior to the 1973-84 period of restraint, monetary policies were 
offset, to some degree, by fiscal initiatives. Since 1973, that practice 
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TABLE 1 
Recent Economic Trends: 
Canada, United States and the OECD Countries 
Average Average Recession Recovery 
1966-1973 1974-1980 1981-1982 1983-1984 
Growth in Real GNP/GDP 
Canada 5.5 % 2.9 % -0.6 % 3.8 % 
United States 3.6 2.4 0.2 5.3 
OECD 4.7 2.5 0.8 1.9 
Unemployment 
Canada 5.1 7.2 9.3 11.7 
United States 4.5 6.8 8.7 8.6 
OECD 3.4 5.4 7.7 8.8 
Consumer Price Inflation 
Canada 4.3 9.4 11.7 5.1 
United States 4.4 9.3 8.3 3.8 
OECD 4.9 10.4 9.2 5.3 
Productivity 
Canada 2.6 0.0 -0.4 2.2 
United States 1.6 0.1 0.1 2.5 
OECD 3.7 1.5 0.8 2.8 
SOURCE: Canada, Department of Finance, l985a, p.4. 
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TABLE 2 
Interest Rates, Canada and U.S. 
1973 - 1983 
(Treasury Bills, 90 Days) 
INTEREST RATE 
--------------------------------
Year Canada u.s. 
--------
---------- ----------
1973 5.47 7.02 
1974 7.82 7.87 
1975 7.40 5.82 
1976 8.87 5.00 
1977 7.33 5.26 
1978 8.68 7.22 
1979 11.69 10.04 
1980 12 . .79 11.61 
1981 17.72 14.08 
1982 13.96 10.69 
1983 9.27 8.14 
SOURCE: C.D.Howe Institute, 1983. 
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has continued with one major difference. With restraint, high interest 
rates and a tight money supply has been associated with a loss in 
government revenue and increased tax expenditures. Hence, there was a 
rapid increase in the government debt. In 1974, at the beginning of 
the recession, the federal debt was less than $25 billion (17% of GNP; 
$1,100 per person). By 1984, it reached $190 billion (45% of GNP; 
$7,500 per person). The public debt charges during this period increased 
from 1% of GNP and 5% of federal revenues to over 4% of GNP and 27% of 
budgetary revenues. The increase was particularly dramatic in the past 
four years. (Canada, Department of Finance [1985]). Social housing 
expenditures were restrained during the period but restraint in direct 
expenditures was offset by tax expenditures for private sector housing. 
One reason for the difference in treatment was the necessity, as already 
suggested, to offset the rising problem of affordability for the middle 
classes in the context of recessionary pressures. Still another was the 
degree of freedom allowed by the relatively low level of overall public 
expenditure in the Canadian housing market. Throughout the recessionary 
period, direct housing expenditures, that is, the annual budget of CMHC, 
accounted for less than 1% of GNE and only 2% to 5% of total government 
expenditures. As Figure 1 indicates, the peak in direct housing expendi-
tures occurred in 1975, the year the· program was initiated in response to 
the economic instability of 1973/74. After 1975, however, government 
restraint measures came into play, limiting the size of direct housing 
expenditures relative to the rest of the budget. 
Overall social expenditures of government were not primarily 
responsible for growth in the deficit during the restraint period as 
can be appreciated by reference to Figure 2. Social expenditures include 
all transfer payments {unemployment insurance, pensions, assistance, 
and workers' compensation) as well as social services (health, education 
and welfare). From 1973 to 1983 (latest available data), social expen-
ditures actually declined as a percentage of government expenditures 
....., 
c 
~ ,, 
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;jj 
c.. 
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FIGURE 2 
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while increasing only marginally in relation to Gross National Expenditure. 
In fact, from 1974 to 1981, expenditures as a percentage of GNE remained 
constant. Canada, in comparison to most OECD countries, was a modest 
social spender. Comparative data show that from 1973 to 1984, Canada 
spent less than all the countries of continental northern Europe except 
Switzerland. Expenditures exceeded only those of the U.S.A. and Britain. 
(OECD~ 1984) 
The modesty of the Canadian Welfare State is important to keep in 
perspective as we turn to an examination of housing subsidies. Unlike 
social welfare states in Europe, which already had been initiated prior 
to World War II, Canadian welfare measures were not consolidated until 
the 1960s. Prior to that period, only unemployment insurance, old age 
security and family allowances had been introduced. The wartime appara-
tus which gave the Canadian state extensive involvement in most aspects 
of the economic sphere was systematically dismantled after 1945 to be 
replaced by private enterprise. Rent control, price and supply controls 
and social programs were transferred from the federal government to 
provincial jurisdictions or ended. Wartime Housing, a major state 
developer and landlord during the war~ was replaced by the Central 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, a mortgage bank primarily for financial 
institutions. The large stock of public housing during and immediately 
after the war was sold off. (Wade, 1984) The period from 1945 to 1963 saw 
few changes in the social welfare apparatus. A change of government in 
1963 established five years of minority rule. Subsequently, social 
reform movements combined with economic expansion to create pressure 
for major amendments to the National Housing Act (1964), along with other 
social measures. 
The 1964 amendments to the National Housing Act (NHA) introduced, 
for the first time, an effective public housing construction program 
and a non-profit housing program for the elderly. Between 1949, when public 
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housing was first introduced, and the 1964 NHA, only 12,140 public housing 
units had been built. In contrast, about 40,000 private sector rental units 
were subsidized as of 1964. The entire emphasis of Canada's National 
Housing Act was on increasing access to mortgages for individual home 
ownership and on subsidizing private sector rental starts. By the mid-
1960s, this attempt to leave housing totally within the private sector 
had failed. However, the social housing programs introduced in 1964 were 
carefully designed to supplement, not replace, private sector housing 
activities and subsidies. The new non-market housing programs were de-
signed to be very narrowly targetted and relatively small in scale so as 
not to compete with the private sector. As a result, the federal and 
provincial governments began jointly financing non-market housing for 
certain categories of "worthy poor," generally single parent families on 
welfare and the elderly. About 170,000 public housing and about 19,000 
senior citizen housing units were built under the 1964 NHA. (Dennis and 
Fish, 1972; Rose, 1980) 
The election of a majority Liberal government in 1968, combined with 
economic prosperity and growing demands for social reform to create 
major new government initiatives in the seventies. These included 
regional economic expansion, improved unemployment insurance, and the 
establishment of the first federal urban affairs department. Another 
minority government following the 1972 election, with a social democratic 
third party holding the balance of power, resulted in further improve-
ments to Canada's welfare state including tax reforms, revised family 
allowances, and major amendments to the National Housing Act (1973). 
Significantly, the 1973 NHA (approved just before the 1974 recession) 
introduced public, private and co-operative non-profit housing programs, 
a rural and native housing program, and a public land banking program for 
assisted housing. These expanded the potential scope of Canada's non-
market housing programs. The targetted group was expanded to include low 
and moderate income households so as to achieve a broader social mix within 
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housing projects. The co-operative housing program was a major innovation 
for Canada, allowing the residents to jointly co-own and manage their 
housing on a non-profit, non-equity basis. Funding for these programs, 
however, was never very substantial and they have continually been under 
attack from the housing industry lobby. About 180,000 non-profit and co-
operative housing units have been built since 1973. The total size of 
Canada's non-market housing sector is, nonetheless, still very small. 
The public housing and non-profit housing programs have resulted in about 
380,000 new or rehabilitated units, representing only about 4% of Canada's 
housing stock. (CMHC, Canadian Housing Statistics, various years) 
The years of restraint from 1973 to 1984 were essentially a period of 
conflict over the spoils of the newly created welfare state. More 
specifically, they were a struggle over state expenditures to promote private 
capital accumulation and federal social initiatives. Prior to 1963, the 
post-war compromise between capital and labour, extracted at a high cost 
in Europe, required little of the Canadian government than a few transfer 
programs. From 1963 to 1973, the expansion of federal social programs 
was a principal factor in the rapid growth of state expenditures. After 
1973, pressures to support private capital accumulation again took the 
ascendancy. The new political ideology stressed that capital accumulation 
was the basis of society. "For the economy to grow, capital must grow. 
For capital to grow there must be profits. For profits to be large there 
must be fewer wage demands, higher productivity, and fewer social welfare 
programs to drain off profits and capital." (Drover & Moscovitch, 1981, 
19) Wage controls, cut-backs in public expenditures, changes in unemploy-
ment insurance, the erosion of hea1th insurance, the expansion of the prison 
system, the promotion of private sector housing, and the stimulation of 
tax expenditures were all fostered to right the imbalances of the previous 
decade. Housing was also singled out as a cause for concern. 
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3.0 HOUSING SUBSIDIES 1973-84: FAVOURING PROFITABILITY 
The years following 1973 were the most volatile ever in the history 
of Canada's housing subsidy programs owing to the highly unfavourable 
macro-economic conditions already noted, combined with rapid increases 
in the cost of housing and the failure of the private rental supply sector. 
Hence, there were dramatic swings in housing expenditures and rapid turn-
over in the establishment and abandonment of housing subsidies. Virtually 
all the activity has focused on the private housing market because of 
pressure from developers to stimulate housing production through tax 
expenditures. The non-profit and co-operative housing programs, which had 
been poised for take-off after the 1973 NHA revisions, depended exten-
sively on direct public expenditures. They increased initially, as a 
result of the new legislation, but social housing expenditures contrary 
to earlier expectations, continued to comprise a very small portion of 
Canada's housing subsidies. 
In response to political pressure, and economic necessity, the 
government introduced a range of subsidies to meet rapid changes in the 
housing market. Social housing subsidies (non-profit and co-operative) 
usually involved direct subsidies and loans. The entrepreneurial programs 
were more variable. In addition to direct subsidies and loans, home 
ownership and private rental housing was subsidized by tax expenditures, 
such as the Registered Home Ownership Savings Plan (RHOSP) and the 
Multiple Unit Residential Building (MURB) program. The RHOSP was continued 
throughout the period of restraint while the much more expensive MURB 
program was turned on and off. The MURB program allowed wealthy individ-
uals to shelter income from other sources by investing in apartment projects. 
The initial attempts by restraint minded finance ministers to discontinue 
MURB's brought protest from the investment and development lobbies. 
Direct subsidy programs, such as the Assisted Home Ownership Program 
(AHOP) and the Assisted Rental Program (ARP), accounted for a smaller 
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portion of these expenditures. Both direct and indirect approaches to 
stimulating private sector housing investments also spawned additional 
subsidy initiatives particularly in the dramatic downturn of economic 
activity after 1981, which shall be discussed later. (Hulchanski and 
Grieve, 1984) In general, subsidies were modified in response to three 
policy initiatives during the 1973-84 period: Keynesianism (1973-78); 
Keynesianism in retreat (1978-1981); and Keynesianism in disguise 
( 1 981-1 984) . 
3.1 The Keynesian Response, 1974 to 1978 
The period from 1973 to 1978 was a period of dramatic expansion in 
government housing subsidies. It was a response to the political 
pressures caused by rapid increases in the cost of housing and to the 
economic pressures caused by a significant fall in housing starts. 
Housing starts, both ownership and apartment, dropped dramatically in 
1973 when several programs aimed at stimulating housing investment came 
on stream. (Figure 3) Job maintenance and job creation became important 
considerations when the unemployment rate began to rise in 1974 and 
continued to rise each year until levelling off in 1978. In response 
to the rising inflation rate, wage and price controls were introduced in 
1975. The housing sector was dramatically affected by these initial years 
of economic instability. The rules of the housing investment game, which 
worked so well during the prosperous 1960s and early 1970s, no longer 
applied. Canada's largest development corporations, responsible for the 
1960s apartment construction boom, had all made the same investment deci-
sion by the mid-1970s: to abandon the residential sector. It was no 
longer as profitable and the risks were much greater. The impact of this 
decision was mainly felt in the rental sector. The single family housing 
sector continued to be dominated by smaller builders. 
The federal response to this situation was essentially Keynesian, 
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to have government spend its way out on the assumption that the problem 
was only temporary. Though restraint measures were introduced in most 
key sectors with the imposition of national wage and price controls, and 
social expenditures were contained, as noted previously, the federal 
government could not allow housing starts to fall even further. The 
middle class was increasingly vocal about house prices and tenants about 
rising rents and the residential construction firms were increasingly 
vocal about their survival. In his May 1974 Budget Speech, the Finance 
Minister made special mention-of the impact of inflation on housing and 
his commitment to introduce new spending programs: 
An important aspect of the recent inflationary experience in ' 
Canada has been its impact on the cost of housing and the 
ability of the average Canadian, particularly young people and 
people of modest incomes, to meet their housing needs. The 
government has put into place a number of important programs 
and measures to ease both the supply and cost aspects of the 
problem. These measures are reflected in the expansion of the 
budget of Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation to $1.2 
billion per year. (Canada, Department of Finance, 1974a) 
A few months later, in another budget speech, the Finance Minister 
admitted that the 11 Weakness in this sector of our economy troubles me a 
good deal, 11 because it 11 threatens to reduce employment, raise production 
costs and increase housing prices and rents. 11 11 Even more important, 11 
he continued, 11 a reduction in the supply of new housing could lead to 
a lower standard of accommodation than Canadians deserve. 11 (Canada, 
Department of Finance, 1974c) A quick response, therefore, was necessary 
for reasons of legitimation and accumulation. As a result, an unpre-
cedented range of federal housing activity was initiated, expanding 
existing programs and introducing several new home ownership and rental 
supply programs. Virtually all the new expenditures were directed to the 
private housing market. On the other hand, the government had no inten-
tion of expanding its role in social housing. It was seeking a temporary 
11 quick fix 11 for the slump in private housing investment. 
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For the ownership sector, the Assisted Home Ownership Program was 
expanded and the Registered Home Ownership Savings Program (RHOSP) was 
introduced 11 in order to assist young people in accumulating the capital 
required for a down payment on a house 11 and as a means of providing 
11 an important new source of mortgage funds to finance the construction 
of the new housing we require. 11 (Canada, Department of Finance 1974c, 
18) For the private rental sector the Assisted Rental Program was 
initiated and the Multiple Unit Residential Building (MURB) tax provision 
introduced, creating a tax shelter for wealthy investors by permitting 
capital allowances on new rental projects to be written off against 
other income. In addition, because of tenant concerns over r1s1ng rents 
and as part of wage and price controls, all provinces adopted rent con-
trols by 1976. No new social housing programs were introduced and funding 
levels for the 1973 NHA's non-profit and co-operative housing programs 
remained very low. The changing macro-economic conditions brought about 
by the 1973 recession focused federal housing activity solely on the private 
housing market. The problem was, according to the Minister of Finance, 
11 the decline in new housing starts -especially in rental housing, where 
construction was curtailed by the increasing squeeze of costs against 
real income. 11 (Canada, Department of Finance 1974c, 5) 
This action by the federal government did have its impact on housing 
expenditures and housing starts. Housing expenditures increased sharply. 
As Table 3 indicates, total CMHC expenditures, which includes all the 
federal government's direct housing subsidies and loans, increased from 
$1 billion in 1973 to $1.85 billion in 1975. CMHC expenditures remained 
close to the $2.0 billion level until 1978. Not included in CMHC's 
budget are the housing subsidies provided through the tax system. RHOSP 
and MURB~ for example, cost the federal government an average of $60 
million and $110 million annually during this period. (Dowler, 1983) 
It is important to note that these annual federal housing expenditure 
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TABLE 3 
CMHC Social Housing and Market Housing Expenditures, 
1973-1984 
(millions of Canadian dollars) 
Social Market 
Housing Housing 
Total Total as a % of Total as a % of 
CMHC Social Total CMHC Market Total CMHC 
Expenditures Housing Expenditures Housing Expenditures 
------------------------------------------------------------
1973 1,062.6 477.8 45.0% 175.8 16.5% 
1974 1,339.9 498.9 37.2% 484.2 36.1% 
1975 1,846.0 937.5 50.8% 526.2 28.5% 
1976 1,907.9 930.1 48.7% 351.1 18.4% 
1977 1,889.8 678.4 35.9% 511.3 27.1% 
1978 1,879.3 696.8 37.1% 276.2 14.7% 
1979 1,190.3 458.2 38.5% 113.7 9.6% 
1980 1,323.6 476.8 36.0% 82.1 6.2% 
1981 1,333.2 557.9 41.8% 101.1 7.6% 
1982 2,214.4 747.7 33.8% 885.8 40.0% 
1983 2,767.8 920.8 33.3% 1,029.4 37.2% 
1984 2,140.1 1,107.3 51.7% 178.2 8.3% 
------------------------------------------------------------
Total 20,894.9 8,488.2 40.6% 4 '715 .1 22.6% 
Annual 
Avg. 1, 741.2 707.4 40.6% 392.9 22.6% 
SOURCE: CMHC, 1982, 1984. 
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levels do not reflect total new spending recommitments. Many housing 
programs were structured in such a way so as to pass the costs onto 
future budgets. The stream of subsidies was dispensed over a number 
of years and federal accounting methods did not provide an estimate of 
the total being committed in each year. The .Assisted Rental Program, 
for example, subsidized 122,600 units between 1975 and 1978 but cost 
CMHC only $31.7 million in those four years. From 1979 to 1984, 
however, another $184.2 million in ARP subsidies were paid out by CM1HC. 
(CMHC, 1984) This type of subsidy will continue for many years. 
Furthermore, rental investors were permitted to stack the ARP subsidy 
with the MURB tax incentive. The MURB subsidy is also dispersed over 
a number of years, wfth only a small portion of the cost of the program 
delivered in the year the project was built. 
The Keynesian response did have an impact on housing starts. As 
Figure 3 indicates, both single family and apartment starts increased 
in 1976 though they began to fall thereafter. There would have been 
no increase and the fall would have been much more dramatic if government 
had not intervened. Most purchasers of new single family houses received 
one or more forms of subsidies. Virtually all the rental starts after 
1974 were subsidized, only a minority of these subsidized starts were 
in the non-market social housing sector. The majority of the rental 
subsidies were investment incentives to private developers. This helped 
maintain the fiction that there was indeed a viable private rental 
sector. This rental sector, however, was no longer responding to supply 
and demand signals in the marketplace. It was responding to the very 
lucl'1ative government subsidy programs. Government was, in effect, bribing 
private rental investors. If the bribe offered was substantial enough, 
rental investment would take place. Once the Assisted Rental Program 
ended in 1978, apartment starts slumped to the lowest levels in 20 years 
in spite of tremendous demand and even though a major private rental tax 
subsidy program continued to exist (MUR8 1 s). Vacancy rates across the 
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country were at their lowest levels in the post war period. With a 
growing federal deficit and the growing realization among policy makers 
that the slump was not a temporary aberration, the Keynesian response 
was abandoned and restraint, or at least the appearance of restraint, 
was introduced. 
3.2 Keynesianism in Retreat, 1978 to 1981 
The second period, represents an attempt by the federal government 
to further restrain its spending. The need for restraint in the growth 
of government expenditures was discussed in the March 1977 budget and 
became a major theme thereafter. In terms of total housing expendi-
tures, however, the restraintwas limited and largely cosmetic. The 
reason for this was the relatively small size of housing expenditures. 
Though direct housing expenditures and the indirect housing related tax 
expenditures had increased significantly since 1983, housing still 
comprised one of the relatively small categories of government spending. 
Because of this and because of the continuing need to play a role in 
both legitimation and accumulation with respect to housing, the impact 
of federal restraint on housing was both small and temporary. 
By examining CMHC's budget, it would appear that significant cuts 
were made in housing programs because the total budget fell to $1.2 
billion from $1.9 billion the year before, a 37% decrease in just one 
year. A number of programs were indeed cut, but they only accounted 
for part of the decline in CMHC's budget. In 1978, as part of its 
restraint program, the federal government also decided to minimize its 
direct mortgage lending activity. Prior to that, the social housing 
programs, as well as some of the market housing programs, had been 
receiving full or partial mortgages directly from CMHC. After 1978, 
a new formula required these programs to obtain their mortgages from 
private lenders, thereby permitting the government's role in direct 
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lending to decline while increasing the role of the private sector - a 
major objective of restraint. 
This shift from government to private lending accounted for a great 
deal of the "decline" in CMHC expenditures between 1979 and 1981. (See 
Table 3) But the decline was partly illusory. It allowed for the appear-
ance that federal spending as well as the government's role in the 
housing sector was being cut in response to restraint measures when in 
fact it simply passed on even greater costs to future budgets. Because 
the government borrows money at a better interest rate than is obtainable 
by social housing agencies in the private mortgage market, the subsidies 
provided to social housing had to be increased to cover the difference. 
These additional subsidies, however, did not benefit low and moderate 
income groups since they were used to pay the additional costs involved 
in using private mortgage lenders. Financial institutions became the 
primary beneficiary of this budgetary manoeuvre. 
Another way in which the impact of restraint on housing was more 
illusion than fact relates to the proportionate increase of housing 
related tax expenditures. The RHOSP was maintained and MURB, though dis-
continued for a year, was also reintroduced. It was Finance Minister 
All en MacEachen who reintroduced MURBs in 1980 to "reduce shortages of 
rental accommodation and provide a needed stimulus for the construction 
industry." (Canada, Department of Finance, 1980, 104) The irony of 
this reintroduction of MURB tax incentives was that it was announced 
in the October 1980 budget in which the Finance Minister launched an 
attack on tax expenditures. He noted that tax expenditures can be very 
inefficient and expensive and "tend to pyramid with the result that a 
number of profitable corporations or wealthy individuals pay little or 
no tax." (Canada, Department of Finance, 1980) Yet, because of the 
continuing failure of the private rental sector to supply units on a non-
subsidized basis, the government gave in to the tremendous pressure from 
the housing industry and the tax shelter investment industry and reintroduced 
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the lucrative MURB tax incentives. By maintaining RHOSP and MURB~ 
future middle class home owners and wealthy individuals in the 50% tax 
bracket retained their respective housing investment subsidies in spite 
of restraint. Since these did not show up in the federal budget they 
were easier to retain than the dnrect spending programs. The federal 
government thereby benefited politically by maintaining these programs 
and it assisted private accumulation in both the troubled ownership 
and r.ental sectors. RHOSP helped address the high cost of becoming a 
home owner and MURB addressed the lack of profitability in the private 
rental sector. 
The housing measures introduced during this second period were 
totally in keeping with the growing neo-conservative approach to 
government budgets which was emerging under the Liberal government at 
the time. Measures were taken to reduce the growth in the size of direct 
expenditures and to increase the reliance on the private sector wherever 
possible. This political agenda, combined with the unstable macro-
economic conditions, had its impact on the housing policy making process 
within CMHC. By the late 1970s, the national office of CMHC became a 
virtual lobby organization for the housing industry. The perennial 
struggle within the CMHC bureaucracy between the social housing people 
and the market oriented people was won by the advocates of the private 
market. CMHC's research activity and policy advocacy shifted to the 
promotion of measures aimed at promoting and assisting the "efficient" 
private housing supply sector and at attacking non-profit and co-operative 
housing programs as being "inefficient and poorly targetted." 
By 1980, both CMHC and the housing industry lobby began advocating 
the replacement of social housing programs with a national shelter 
allowance scheme. In March 1981, the Federal Minister responsible for 
housing announced the time had come to "seriously consider the idea of 
a housing allowance" and at its 1982 annual meeting, the Canadian Home 
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Builders Association adopted a resolution urging "that the current 
Federal non-profit and co-operative housing programs be discontinued 11 and 
replaced by a shelter allowance. (Hulchanski, 1983; Clayton, 1984; 
Steele, 1985) Shelter allowances were favoured because they provided 
low income households a monthly check to help them obtain housing from 
the private sector, rather than rely on government social housing supply 
programs. The private commodity nature of the rental stock would thereby 
be maintained. The debate was no longer one of whether or not there would 
be large scale housing subsidy programs. The debate had become one of 
whether the housing subsidies would be provided on a market or non-
market basis. 
By the early 1980s the housing debate in Canada, which was generally 
phrased in terms of improving efficiency of government subsidies by 
targetting programs only at the "truly needy," became a surface mani-
festation of a much deeper clash, best characterized as the "market-welfare" 
and "social-welfare" housing options. Due to the inability of the private 
housing sector to supply moderate cost housing without substantial 
subsidies to investors, the fundamental policy issue was whether public 
funds should be used to maintain the private housing supply sector, the 
commodity form of housing, or whether government should improve and expand 
its non-market social housing supply programs. The series of ad hoc 
programs during the 1973-1978 period were largely based on the assumption 
that the problem was temporary and that the "market-welfare" programs 
would be temporary. When some of the key programs were withdrawn in 1978, 
however, housing supply slipped into further decline and prices in the 
existing stock dramatically increased. After a few years, it was more 
than apparent that something had to be done, and pressure was placed on 
the government to introduce new subsidy programs. 
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3.3 Keynesianism in Disguise, 1982 to 1984 
The attempt to minimize housing e~penditures did not last very long. 
Mortgage interest rates began to rise dramatically, moving from 11% in 
late 1979, to a peak of 21% in August and September of 1981, and levelling 
off in the 12% to 13% range during 1983. (CMHC, 1983, 65) A housing 
crisis of major proportions was created by the addition of these highest 
ever mortgage interest rates to the already troubled housing sector. In 
addition to the low vacancy rates, the lack of unsubsidized private rental 
construction, and the high cost of single family housing, many home 
owners were facing foreclosure when they renewed their mortgages. All 
the ownership subsidy programs of the previous eight years were aimed at 
inducing moderate income tenants to become home owners. The normal 
mortgage at that time was for a five year period. The five years came 
due when interest rates were at their highest in the early 1980s. Many 
simply could not afford to carry the new, much higher monthly cost of 
the mortgage. 
The mortgage crisis became a political crisis for the government 
at a time when the ruling Liberals were already highly unpopular. Middle 
class home owners began forming organizations to resist foreclosure and 
to lobby for reductions in interest rates. The housing industry also 
became a very active lobby due to the impact of interest rates on housing 
starts. In spite of its restraint program, new housing initiatives were 
announced in both the November 1981 and the June 1982 federal budgets. 
In the November 1981 budget, the Finance Minister stated that he 
was "greatly concerned over the distress of homeowners having to renew 
their mortgages at higher interest rates, and over the shortage of rental 
accommodation." (Canada, Department of Finance, 198la, 5) For homeowners 
he announced the Canada Mortgage Renewal Plan (CMRP) and for rental 
investors he announced the Canada Rental Supply Program (CRSP). CMRP 
allowed homeowners to defer part of the higher interest rates. "The 
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government is prepared to guarantee the interest deferred, within limits, 11 
the Minister announced, 11 When mortgage payments exceed 30% of gross income. 11 
(Canada, Department of Finance, l98la, 5) CRSP was a revival of the 
Assisted Rental Program, under a different funding formula. 11 In order 
to encourage the construction of rental housing, 11 announced the Minister, 
11 the government will provide interest-free loans of up to $7,500 per unit 
for 15,000 units allocated to tight markets across Canada. 11 (Canada, 
Department of Finance, 198la, 5) After the housing industry argued that 
$7,500 was not enough, this limit was removed, resulting in interest-free 
loans of $12,000 to $15,000 per unit. Only seven months later another 
federal budget was announced with even more housing subsidies. 
In a period when Keynesian fiscal policy was supposed to have been 
discarded, the federal government went on a spending spree. A new pro-
gram, the Canada Home Ownership Stimulation Plan (CHOSP), gave $3~000 
grants to all purchasers of new housing and to first-time home buyers who 
purchased an existing house. Spending on the Canada Home Renovation Plan 
was doubled as were the number of units subsidized by the CanadatMortgage 
Renewal Plan which was expanded to include a larger number of households. 
Funding for 2,500 more social housing units was also provided. This was 
the first time since the 1973 introduction of the social housing programs 
that the federal budget made a special additional allocation to non-market 
housing. Each of these program categories was justified on the basis of 
job creation. For example, the increased social housing allocation, 
according to the Minister, would 11 generate an additional 4,500 jobs, 
largely in 1983. 11 (Canada, Department of Finance, 1982, 21) The doubling 
of CRSP would result in an estimated 54,000 new jobs and the doubling of 
the Home Renovation Plan would produce about 10,000 new jobs. Similar 
home ownership initiatives were reintroduced in the 1983 and 1984 budgets 
with the latter adding a mortgage rate protection plan. 
In short, the problem was deeper than just housing. In a fashion 
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similar to the previous thirty years, government used spending on the 
housing sector in a counter cyclical fashion even though the economic 
circumstances were totally different from the 1950s and 1960s. A Keynes-
ian policy was being implemented in a non-Keynesian period. The 
housing programs resulting from the recession of 1973 mainly addressed 
the failure of private housing supply. Though the housing sector still 
faced the same problems, broader economic and political dynamics ten 
years later led to the use of the housing sector for its job creation 
potential. None of the new housing programs represented an attempt to 
stabilize or improve the operation of the housing market, in fact they 
resulted in the opposite. Nor were they designed to help the housing 
situation of low and moderate income Canadians. They were simply an 
immediate response to an immediate economic and political crisis. The 
sectors with the most political clout gained the most. Middle class 
home owners and real estate investors were the primary beneficiaries. 
Some 250,000 home owners received the $3,000 CHOSP grants and rental 
investors received CRSP subsidies for construction of 33,000 rental units 
in addition to the on-going MURB tax incentive which was subsidizing 
about 20,000 rental units per year. In comparison, there was only an 
additional allocation of 2,500 social housing units. 
4.0 IMPACT: POLARIZATION BY TENURE AND REGRESSIVE DISTRIBUTION 
OF SUBSIDIES 
One impact of housing subsidies during a period of restraint was 
the polarization of households by tenure. In addition, the system of 
housing subsidies and incentives has been one of the more regressive 
categories of social expenditure in Canada in terms of assistance to 
lower income individuals. Expenditures on social housing programs, in 
particular, have been one of the smaller spending items in the system of 
direct and indirect housing subsidies. Larger benefits to middle and 
high income Canadians have been extended through housing related tax 
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expenditures. The $125 million annual cost of RHOSP~ for example, has 
been available only to those who could afford to defer expenditures of 
$1,000 a year. The MURB program, in similar fashion, led to over $1.5 
billion in foregone revenue in eight of the past eleven years. MURB, 
like RHOSP, benefited higher income groups. 
Table 4, from the Department of Finance, provides a summary of who 
benefited from housing r~lated tax expenditures. In his 1984 report to 
the House of Commons, Auditor General Kenneth Dye referred to the 11massive 
impact 11 of tax expenditures which were 11 a huge hidden budget in the 
financial affairs of Canada. 11 (Canada, Auditor General, 1984, Section 1, 
23) For every $100 spent directly, Dye estimated $30 to $50 was spent 
indirectly by way of tax expenditures. Tax expenditures in general, and 
housing tax expenditures in particular, mainly benefit the highest income 
households. As the figures in Table 4 from the 1979 Department of Finance 
tax expenditures accounts indicate, the greater 
the housing tax expenditure benefits received. 
Finance, 198lb) 
one's income, the greater 
(Canada, Department of 
Unfortunately we were not able to provide recent estimates of tax 
expenditures because the Canadian government has refused to compile and 
publish up-dated tax expenditure accounts. Moreover, it is not only 
the regressive nature of housing tax expenditures which is at issue, but 
their size relative to direct housing expenditures. Housing tax expendi-
tures are two to three times greater than direct spending programs on 
housing. In most other budgetary categories, the relationship between 
the two types of spending is just the opposite - tax expenditures are 
less, between 30% and 50% according to the Auditor General, than the 
direct expenditures. This means that in housing, for every $100 in direct 
total expenditures, some $200 to $300 is spent in tax expenditures. 
Another indicator of the distributional impact of housing subsidy 
programs was obtained by examining trends in the distribution of home 
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TABLE 4 
Average Doll~r Benefits Per Tax Filer 
From Federal Housing Tax Expenditures, 1979 
Total Income Average $ Benefit from 
Group Housing Tax Expenditures 
Under $ 5,000 $ 32 
5,000 - 10,000 171 
10,000 - 15,000 314 
15,000 - 20,000 619 
20,000 - 25,000 964 
-25,000- 30,000 1,312 
30,000 - 50,000 1,994 
50,000 -100,000 3,670 
$100,000 & over 6,753 
SOURCE: Canada, Department of Finance, 198lb. 
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ownership among income groups. Table 5 demonstrates that there were gains 
among the top two quintiles and declines in the bottom two. The percentage 
of households owning their own units remained virtually the same during 
the period (an overall change of 0.6% more home owners). What was dramatic 
was the change in who were home owners. During a period in which a great 
deal of direct and indirect subsidies were provided to the ownership sector 
and to first time home buyers, households in the highest two income 
quintiles made substantial gains in home ownership rates (up to 10% each) 
whereas the households in the two lowest quintiles increasingly became 
tenants. The middle quintile household remained about the same, with a 
small increase of 4% in the rate of home ownership during the entire 
period since 1967. Since 1973, however, the home ownership rate of the 
second quintile also declined, from 53.3% to 52.4%. In short, fewer 
households in the lower 60% of the income range are home owners today 
than they were back in 1967. The temporary programs introduced since that 
time have not, it would appear, been able to out pace the tide of rising 
house prices and mortgage interest rates. This trend of course, was not 
due solely to the regressive nature of housing program subsidies. Macro-
economic trends continued to work against lower income households. The 
1967 data are included to allow for comparison after the onslaught of 
recession in the mid-seventies. 
The increasing rates of home ownership among the upper income groups 
also indicates an equally significant and very troubling trend for the 
rental housing sector. The rental sector was becoming an increasingly 
residual one, containing virtually all lower income Canadians and very 
few higher income Canadians. This had not always been the case. Table 6 
indicates that as recently as 1967 the tenant population was divided 
almost equally between each of the income quintiles. The only exception 
was the highest quintile. By 1982, however, the number of higher income 
tenants (tenants with incomes in the fourth and fifth quintiles) declined 
while the number of lower income tenants (tenants with incomes in the 
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TABLE 5 
Changes in Home Ownership Rates Within and Between Income Quintiles 
1967, 1973, 1977, 1981 
% of Households Owning Their Unit 
1967 1973 1977 1981 
Lowest Quintile 62.0 % 50.0 % 47.4% 43.0 % 
Second Quintile 55.5 53.6 53.3 52.4 
Middle Quintile 58.6 57.5 63.2 62.7 
Fourth Quintile 64.2 69.8 73.2 75.0 
Highest Quintile 73.4 81.2 82.3 83.5 
Total 62.7 62.4 63.9 63.3 
SOURCE: Statistics Canada, 1983. 
Change 
1967-1981 
- 19 % 
- 3 % 
+ 4 % 
+11 % 
+ 10 % 
+ 0.6 % 
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TABLE 6 
Henter Households by Income Quintile 
Canada, 1967, 1973, 1977, 1981 
Income Quintile 1967 1973 1977 1981 
Lowest Quintile 20.4 26.6 29.1 31.1 
Second Quintile 23.9 24.7 25.9 26.0 
Middle Quintile 22.2 22.6 20.4 20.3 
Fourth Quintile 19.2 16.1 14.8 13.6 
Highest Quintile 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOURCE: Statistics Canada, 1983. 
Change 
1967-1981 
+10. 7 
+ 2.1 
- 1. 9 
- 5.6 
- 5.3 
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first and second quintiles) increased, both by significant amounts for 
such a short period of time. This means that those households able 
to take advantage of the home ownership option did so leaving virtually 
all those who had no choice in the rental sector. In general, then, 
the private sector programs were supply incentives without providing 
direct benefits to lower income households. By contrast about 80% 
of the residents in non-profit and co-operative housing projects were low 
and moderate income households. Nevertheless, through the period of 
restraint, the private sector subsidies were much larger than the non-
profit and co-operative subsidies. The MURB tax benefits were especially 
costly. 
More analysis needs to be done on the effectiveness of these past 
programs. The federal government, in the period since 1973, appeared 
to have taken the easy way out by assuming that housing problems were 
temporary and that minor, temporary programs would help improve the 
situation. This was much easier than attempting to develop a longer term 
policy framework. It also appears that these programs did not really 
address the affordability problem. Only the small-scale non-profit and 
co-operative housing programs contributed to increasing the stock of 
affordable housing. The units subsidized by ARP~ MURB, CRSP, AHOP and 
the CHOSP were subject to inflation in the speculative real estate 
markets in which they were located. 
As for the immediate future, there appears to be a relatively clean 
slate. Most of the housing programs introduced by federal budgets since 
1973 had been discontinued by mid 1984. The election of a Conservative 
government in September 1984 has resulted in the elimination of even more 
housing programs and significant budget cuts in others. In the new 
government 1 S November 1984 11 economic statement 11 spending on the social 
housing and housing rehabilitation programs was cut significantly and the 
last phase of the private rental supply program (CRSP) was cut entirely. 
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(Canada, Department of Finance l984c) In its May 1985 Budget the Conserva-
tive government eliminated one home ownership tax expenditure program, 
the Registered Home Owner Savings Plan. However, the Budget provided 
individuals with an exemption from capital gains taxes to a lifetime 
maximum of $500,000. This is in addition to the already existing exemp-
tion of capital gains taxes on the sale of the primary residence. Though 
the intent is to stimulate new job creating investment, no distinction 
was made between capital gains accumulated from past investments versus 
new investments. One result may be that long term owners of the existing 
rental stock will begin cashing in on their buildings and for wealthy 
individuals to begin buying second and third houses as speculative invest-
ments. The new capital gain exemption, therefore, is likely to have serious 
rami fi cations on the affordabil ity of both rental and ownership housing 
in Canada. 
It appears, therefore, that a period of rather severe restraint on 
government housing expenditures began in 1984. This restraint is not only 
due to the market housing orientation of the new government, but also, 
and probably mainly, due to the relatively low and stable mortgage interest 
rates. Whether, however, the new government pursues the same line of 
policy as its Liberal predecessors remains to be seen. A sharp drop in 
housing starts or an increase in interest rates causing housing costs and 
rents to jump suddenly will likely force the new government to behave 
very much like its predecessor. The economic impact and political conse-
quences of doing otherwise is simply too high. The alternative, planning 
and implementing a comprehensive national housing policy and a set of 
coordinated national programs based on the lessons of the past is not yet 
on the new government•s agenda. In fact, as explained earlier, many of 
the key variables - interest rates, unemployment levels, changes in real 
income - are largely determined south of the border. Canada needs to first 
confront this much larger problem before more independent housing policy 
initiatives can be undertaken. For the foreseeable future, it appears that 
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the inequities of the current housing expenditure system will continue, 
that Canadians will continue to be even further polarized by tenure based 
on their income and that Canada's rental sector will increasingly become 
a residual one, the domain of the bottom forty or fifty per cent of the 
income scale. 
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